COMMENTS
DOES “KEEP OUT!” MEAN “STAY OUT!”?: THE IMMIGRATION
AND NATIONALITY ACT’S EFFECT ON ACCESS TO FEDERAL
COURTS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL ACTIONS
Sripriya Narasimhan*
I. INTRODUCTION
The unique and haphazard evolution of immigration law has contributed to its irregularities, idiosyncrasies, and chaos. Scholars have
1
described it in ways that range from “a constitutional oddity” to an
area of law that “has been so radically insulated and divergent from
those fundamental norms of constitutional right, administrative pro2
cedure, and judicial role that animate the rest of our legal system.”
This Comment will examine the impact that the Immigration and
Nationality Act’s provision governing judicial review of orders of removal has on the success of constitutional claims in federal court
such as Bivens claims. The provision governing judicial review of orders of removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), makes judicial review of all
questions of fact and law arising out of an action of removal available
3
only in review of a final order. Effectively, § 1252(b)(9) acts as a
“zipper clause,” forwarding all claims that have been administratively
4
exhausted to the federal appellate courts. The provision was intended to resolve certain procedural and administrative redundancies presented in removal proceedings, such as aliens being able to
*
1
2
3

4

J.D. Candidate, 2010, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.S. 2005, Duke University. Special thanks to Frank Goodman and Shane Cargo.
Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984
SUP. CT. REV. 255, 255.
Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984)).
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (2006) (“Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including
interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any
action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this
subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas
corpus under section 2241 of title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision, by section
1361 or 1651 of such title, or by any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to
review such an order or such questions of law or fact.”).
See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483 (1999).
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file separate proceedings challenging the denial of a stay of deporta5
tion and challenging the deportation order itself. By consolidating
review into one forum, Congress solved the problem of “successive
6
filings and . . . backdoor challenges” to removal orders. The provision, where applicable, only requires exhaustion of administrative
7
procedures and the consolidation of claims for judicial review. It is
8
not intended to eliminate the right to review altogether. In practice,
however, district and circuit courts have found interpreting the
phrase “arising out of an action of removal” to be challenging.
This Comment will examine whether § 1252(b)(9) bars Bivens and
similar constitutional claims in federal court. While the focus of the
Comment will be on Bivens claims, the same discussion and analysis
applies equally to other constitutional claims. Because most of these
claims arise out of the same sets of facts and circumstances, though
they may be wholly separate from the underlying removal proceeding, the issue of whether such claims are barred by § 1252(b)(9) is
muddled.
Courts currently bar a variety of Bivens and constitutional claims
9
for several reasons. However, the lack of uniformity in the determination of these cases does not address the reservations Congress had
when it enacted § 1252(b)(9). In order to adhere to the intent of
Congress in enacting the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and Real ID Act, courts may have to institute a uniform analytical method to the jurisdictional bar.
To quell backdoor challenges, successive filings, and redundant
judicial findings, Congress has dictated that district courts should bar
review of claims that are significantly, factually tied to removal proceedings so that they cannot be considered collateral to the underlying proceeding. While a great deal of scholarly work has focused on
the effects of these limitations on the writ of habeas corpus and related proceedings, the main focus of this Comment is on examining
the effects of the general consolidation provisions contained in the
IIRIRA and § 1252(b)(9), and on providing a coherent methodology
for analyzing the issue. The standard proposed for court use to assess
5

6

7
8
9

See Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 510 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.
2007) (“In enacting section 1252(b)(9), Congress plainly intended to put an end to
the scattershot and piecemeal nature of the review process that previously had held
sway in regard to removal proceedings.”).
See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 270 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing CalcanoMartinez v. INS, 232 F.3d 328, 340 (2d Cir. 2000), aff’d on other grounds, 585 F.3d 559
(2d Cir. 2009).
See id. at 270 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 313 (2001)).
See id.
See infra Section VII.

June 2010]

IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT

1445

whether claims are too factually tied to the underlying removal proceeding to continue in district court is a two-step process: first it examines whether the claims involve actions that arise out of an order
of removal; and second, it examines whether immigration courts can
provide the requested remedy. If the claims can be reviewed in immigration court, they “arise out” of circumstances involving an underlying order of removal and are therefore barred from review in district court. But if immigration courts cannot offer the requested
remedy, these claims should not be barred from district court review.
Section II gives a brief overview of the administrative process individuals undergo when immigration court proceedings have been initiated. Section III offers an introduction to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), explaining Congress’s intent in enacting the 1996
amendments to the INA, which limited the jurisdiction of federal district courts hearing immigration-related claims. Section IV then provides a brief introduction to Bivens claims and cases in which courts
have found an award of money damages appropriate. Then, Section
V gives an explanation of the problems courts have had in interpreting the INA and its effect on an immigration plaintiff’s access to federal courts. Next, Section VI surveys cases applying § 1252(b)(9)
generally, while Section VII offers an analysis of those cases that apply
§ 1252(b)(9) to Bivens or other constitutional claims. In Section VIII,
the results of these cases are compared in order to create a map of
the current jurisprudence regarding the jurisdictional bar of
§ 1252(b)(9). In Section IX, a solution to the tension exhibited in
these cases is provided. Finally, in Section X, the new analysis is applied to the existing case law as an illustration of the proposed solution in practice.
II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) creates the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) and places the administrative procedure
for judicial review of cases flowing out of the BIA under the umbrella
10
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). However, courts have
acknowledged that the APA “does not apply to the conduct of hear11
ings explicitly governed by the INA.” Therefore, the INA and APA,

10

11

Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law after the 1996 Immigration Act, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 1963, 1968 (2000) (explaining that the enactment of the INA “made the judicial
review procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) applicable to cases
arising under the INA” (internal citations omitted)).
Baez-Fernandez v. INS, 385 F. Supp. 2d 292, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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when read together, produce a framework whereby non-citizens who
enter the process of adjudicating immigration claims first seek relief
through the administrative process within the immigration courts,
and, after exhausting their claims in the administrative courts, appeal
their final judgments to the courts of appeals.
The first step for any non-citizen who is forcibly entered into the
adjudication of immigration claims begins with the Executive Office
12
for Immigration Review (EOIR). The EOIR “is responsible for adjudicating immigration cases” through “immigration court proceed13
ings, appellate reviews, and administrative hearings.”
Most commonly, a non-citizen will appear before the EOIR in a removal
14
hearing.
Removal proceeding begin when the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) charges a non-citizen with an immigration law violation by serving the non-citizen with a Notice to Appear (NTA) before
15
an immigration judge. The non-citizen appears for an individual
hearing in which the immigration judge considers the merits of the
16
case and issues an oral decision.
Once the case is complete and the immigration judge issues a de17
cision, either party may choose to appeal the decision to the BIA. If
both parties choose not to appeal, the immigration judge’s decision is
18
considered administratively final. This final order can be executed
unless appealed to a federal court that grants the non-citizen a stay,
but “the alien’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies may lead
19
the court to deny relief.” “Filing an appeal with the BIA from an
immigration judge’s removal decision results in an automatic stay of
20
the execution of the removal order.”
All BIA appeals “now go directly to a single BIA member who
must decide . . . whether the case merits full appellate review or
21
summary affirmance without an opinion.” If the case merits full re12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Responsibilities,
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/responsibilities.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2010).
Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Responsibilities,
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/responsibilities.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2010).
Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Immigration Court Practice
Manual, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/ocij_page1.htm (last visited
Mar. 19, 2010).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ilana E. Greenstein, Board of Immigration Appeals and Federal Court Review of Deportation
and Removal Decisions, in 2 IMMIGRATION PRACTICE MANUAL § 20.2.1 (2004).
Id.
Id. § 20.3.2.
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view, the BIA member refers the case to a three-member panel, which
22
then conducts a full appellate review of the non-citizen’s case.
As an alternative to BIA proceedings, the non-citizen may also use
a motion to reopen “when required by case law or regulation—or
23
when new evidence exists to strengthen the [alien’s] case.” However, once an appeal is filed, “an immigration judge no longer has jurisdiction over the proceedings, and any motion to reopen filed with
24
the BIA is treated as a motion requesting remand.”
After a decision is issued by the BIA, which is final unless referred
to the Attorney General for review, the non-citizen has the opportu25
nity to appeal once more in federal court. “The primary statutory
basis for federal court review of an administratively final removal or26
der is 8 U.S.C. § 1252 . . . .” Once a case reaches the court of appeals, the federal court “may consider only the administrative record
on which the removal order is based, the pleadings, and the parties’
27
briefs” in adjudicating the appeal. “For other types of cases involving immigration issues” not related to removal proceedings, “the
[APA] and the general grant of [federal question] jurisdiction . . . still apply,” and such claims may be brought in federal dis28
trict court.
III. A HISTORY OF THE INA
Judicial intervention in immigration administrative decisions is a
fairly recent phenomenon. In fact, from 1882 to 1952, no statute au29
thorizing a judicial role existed. However, federal courts still informally exercised control in many cases, particularly in correcting immigration officials’ interpretations of the law in the habeas corpus
30
context. However, the enactment of the INA (also referred to as the
“Act”) in 1952 added to the judiciary’s traditionally held jurisdiction
over habeas corpus review by requiring the adjudication of founda-

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Id.
Id. § 20.2.2.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 20.3.1.
Daniel Kanstroom, Immigration Litigation in Federal Court, in 2 IMMIGRATION PRACTICE
MANUAL § 20.5 (2004).
Id. § 20.5(E).
Neuman, supra note 10, at 1967.
Id. Jurisdiction for such adjudications was primarily “founded on the general provision authorizing the grant of habeas corpus to persons in federal custody, the predecessor of the current 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” Id.
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tional issues concerning the authority of executive officials to detail
31
non-citizens for deportation or exclusion.
Since 1961, Congress amended the INA by placing “sole and exclusive” power to review deportation decisions in the courts of ap32
peals. This was an attempt by Congress to cabin access to judicial
33
review that the APA had created. The 1961 amendments allowed
exclusion orders to be reviewed by writ of habeas corpus in the dis,34
trict courts but only allowed deportation orders to be reviewed in
35
the courts of appeals under the Hobbs Act. However, “[t]he 1961
Act contained no specific bars to judicial review for cases and issues
36
properly exhausted administratively.” The INA was “subsequently
amended in 1990, 1991, and 1994” to provide separate procedures
37
for judicial review of deportation and exclusion orders.
In 1996, “two separate pieces of legislation significantly changed
38
judicial review of immigration decisions.” The Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), passed on April 24, 1996, limited judicial review “notably by eliminating it for most non-citizens

31

32

33
34
35
36
37

38

Id. at 1968. “In 1955, the Supreme Court held that declaratory and injunctive relief
under the . . . [APA] were available to test deportation orders under the INA.” Hiroshi Motomura, Judicial Review in Immigration Cases After AADC: Lessons from Civil Procedure, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 385, 395 (2000) (citing Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S.
48, 50–52 (1955)) (footnotes omitted). In 1956, the Court extended this reasoning to
exclusion orders as well. Id. (citing Brownell v. Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 182–86 (1956)).
David M. McConnell, Judicial Review Under the Immigration and Nationality Act: Habeas
Corpus and the Coming of REAL ID (1996–2005), 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 75, 80–81 & n.30
(2007) (“The fundamental purpose behind [placing exclusive review in the courts of
appeals] . . . was to abbreviate the process of judicial review of deportation orders in
order to frustrate certain practices which had come to the attention of Congress,
whereby persons subject to deportation were forestalling departure by dilatory tactics
in the courts.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217,
224 (1963)); see Immigration and Nationality Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5(a),
75 Stat. 650, 651-52, repealed by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 306(b), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-612.
Motomura, supra note 31, at 395.
See § 5(a), 75 Stat. at 651–53 (amending the INA to allow a final exclusion order to be
judicially reviewed through habeas corpus proceedings).
Motomura, supra note 31, at 395 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341–51 (1994)). The Hobbs
Act governs review for several administrative agencies. Id.
McConnell, supra note 32, at 81.
Id. See id. at 81 n. 32 (“Administrative proceedings governing the admission and removal
of aliens from the United States have historically been termed ‘exclusion’ or ‘deportation’ proceedings . . . . With the enactment of the IIRIRA, Congress replaced these differing forms of proceedings with a single form called removal proceedings. . . . A removal
order results from administrative proceedings conducted under new section 240 of the
INA.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). See also Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-694, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990); Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-232, 105 Stat. 1733 (1991); Immigration and
Naturalization Technical Corrections Act, Pub. L. No. 103-416 (1994).
Motomura, supra note 31, at 396.

June 2010]

IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT

1449

39

deportable because of criminal convictions.”
On September 30,
1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which repealed the judicial review
scheme set forth in the INA of 1961 and replaced it with transitional
40
and permanent rules to govern judicial review. While it continued
the substantive limits the AEDPA placed upon judicial review of proceedings, the IIRIRA also restructured judicial review in “fundamen41
tal ways.” Under the IIRIRA, the permanent judicial review rules
codified in § 242 of the INA apply to removal proceedings initiated
42
on or after April 1, 1997. These rules serve to channel all judicial
review of final orders of removal by the Immigration and Naturaliza43
,
tion Service (INS) to the courts of appeals. The IIRIRA and § 242
in particular, placed many limits on the role of the judiciary in immi44
gration cases. In particular, Congress enacted § 242(b)(9), which
serves to consolidate questions for judicial review, both as a matter of
45
time and forum.
IV. AN INTRODUCTION TO BIVENS CLAIMS
A. Bivens and Its Progeny
In the case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau
46
of Narcotics, the Supreme Court first authorized individuals to bring

39

40

41
42
43

44

45
46

Id. at 397; see also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No.
104-132, § 440(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1276–77 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.).
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, §§ 306(a), 306(b), 309(c)(4), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-607 to -12, 3009-26 to -27
(codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1231, 1252). IIRIRA § 306(b) repealed INA § 106 and
created the new INA § 242, which governs judicial review. Id.
Motomura, supra note 31, at 397.
INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (Supp. III 1998); see also McConnell, supra note 32, at 84.
McConnell, supra note 32, at 84. The Act therefore ensures that judicial review will occur
“under the Hobbs Act procedure that had applied to deportation orders under former
§ 106.” Motomura, supra note 31, at 397 (citing INA § 242(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)
(Supp. III 1998)).
“The issue was not whether or when judicial review was available, but rather in
which court. If a matter was included in a ‘final order,’ then § 106(a) applied, and
judicial review was in the court of appeals. If a matter was not included in a ‘final
order,’ then review was in the district court under the general federal question statute . . . and former INA § 279.”
Motomura, supra note 31, at 415.
See INA § 242(a)(2)(B)–(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(2)(B)–(C) (Supp. III 1998) (denying
review to aliens deportable under crime-related grounds, and barring judicial review
of integral categories of discretionary decisions and those that are specifically at the
discretion of the Attorney General).
See id. § 1252(b)(9).
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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claims for damages against federal officials for constitutional viola47
tions even without express statutory authorization. In this case, six
agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics unlawfully entered the
plaintiff’s apartment and conducted a warrantless search and arrest
48
for narcotics violations. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment created a general right to file actions for damages in
cases where federal officials violate constitutional or statutory legal
49
rights. The Court concluded that the plaintiff could recover monetary damages as long as there existed “no special factors counseling
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress” and “no
explicit congressional declarations[s] that persons injured by a federal officer’s violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover
money damages from the agents, but must instead be remitted to
50
another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress.”
The Court quickly signaled to the lower courts and potential
plaintiffs that Bivens could be applied to other constitutional violations soon afterward, when it extended the right to damages to Fifth
51
and Eighth Amendment violations.
However, since Carlson v.
52
Green, the Court has denied Bivens remedies to constitutional violations in a number of cases, focusing mainly on the two exceptions ar53
ticulated in Bivens.

47

48
49
50

51

52
53

Christopher G. Froelich, Closing the Equitable Loophole: Assessing the Supreme Court’s Next
Move Regarding the Availability of Equitable Relief for Military Plaintiffs, 35 SETON HALL L.
REV. 699, 714 (2005).
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 396–97. The Court noted several such factors “counseling hesitation,” which
include questions of federal fiscal policy and the imposition of “liability upon a congressional employee for actions contrary to no constitutional prohibition.” Id. Since
Bivens, the Court has considered a number of cases in which it has denied Bivens remedies to constitutional violations.
See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18–23 (1980) (extending Bivens to situations
where there is no statute conferring the constitutional rights being violated and alternate remedies exist); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979) (holding that
damages are appropriate for violations of the Fifth Amendment because (1) it is a
remedial scheme normally available in federal courts, (2) it would be judicially manageable without difficult questions about valuation or causation, and (3) there are no
alternative forms of relief).
446 U.S. at 14.
See, e.g., Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001) (retreating from
requiring adequate remedies by barring damages where other remedies, even when
they are not federal or fully corrective in nature, are available); Schweiker v. Chilicky,
487 U.S. 412, 424–29 (1988) (holding that administrative schemes that award restitution but not expected damages function as a factor counseling hesitation of federal
court intervention); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983) (holding that special factors counseling hesitation exist in situations where enlisted military personnel
claim constitutional violations by superior officers); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388–
90 (1983) (holding that since the government’s comprehensive, remedial scheme
protecting civil servants against arbitrary action by supervisors provides remedies for
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B. The Intersection of Bivens Claims and the INA
A key question arises in the area of Bivens claims flowing out of
the immigration context. Congress, in enacting the Immigration and
Nationality Act, created a comprehensive scheme, including adjudi54
cation, to assist in the regulation of immigration. Does the statutory
scheme of the INA preclude federal courts from adjudicating Bivens
claims arising out of the immigration context? Or is the INA scheme
for judicial review insufficient for providing relief for some Bivens
claims? Federal courts have grappled with these questions and have
come to varying results, allowing some Bivens claims to be brought in
federal district court, while dismissing others.
V. AN EXPLANATION OF THE PROBLEM
Two key questions arise out of the IIRIRA with regard to judicial
review: (1) at what point does a federal court have jurisdiction to review an immigration-related decision by a government agency; and
(2) in which court can a petitioner bring his or her claim? The answer to both of these questions hinges on the federal courts’ understanding of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).
Section 1252(b)(9) establishes exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over claims “arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to
55
remove an alien.” The Supreme Court has described this provision
as a “general jurisdictional limitation” and an “unmistakable ‘zipper’
56
clause,” which channels all questions of law and fact arising from
57
removal proceedings to the federal courts of appeals. Because it encompasses “‘all questions of law and fact’ and extends to both ‘constitutional and statutory’ challenges,” its expanse has been described by
58
one court of appeals as “breathtaking.”

54
55
56
57
58

these employees, a new judicial remedy for the same constitutional violations was not
necessary).
See supra Section II.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).
Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482–83 (1999).
Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 270 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d on other grounds, 585
F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 510 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “As its text makes manifest, that proviso was designed to consolidate and channel review of all legal and factual questions that arise
from the removal of an alien into the administrative process, with judicial review of
those decisions vested exclusively in the courts of appeals.” Id. Therefore, a petitioner cannot avoid the jurisdictional channel by aggregating claims associated with removal, each one of which would be jurisdictionally barred if brought alone. Id. at 9–
10.
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However, courts are careful to ensure that this jurisdictionlimiting provision of the IIRIRA does not divest district courts entirely
59
of jurisdiction to hear challenges to removal. As the Supreme Court
explained in INS v. St. Cyr, § 1252(b)(9) is intended “to consolidate
judicial review of immigration proceedings into one action in the
60
court of appeals, not to eliminate judicial review altogether.” Congress enacted § 1252(b)(9) in response to “the problem of successive
filings and additional back-door challenges to removal orders,” a
problem created by holdings that allowed parties to initiate separate
proceedings for a challenge to the denial of a stay of deportation in
federal district court and a challenge to the underlying deportation
61
order itself in immigration court. By consolidating review into one
forum, Congress attempted to channel all removal-related challenges
62
into one process.
Courts have, however, been careful to ensure that § 1252(b)(9)’s
63
scope is not limitless.
They have not read the statute’s “arising
from” limitation to “swallow all claims” that tangentially “touch upon,
64
or [can] be traced to, the government’s efforts to remove an alien.”
If Congress had intended for the statute to reach so broadly, it could
65
have used broader language. Since it neglected to do so, Congress’
choice of phrase has been taken by courts to suggest that Congress
did not intend § 1252(b)(9) to take “into its scope claims with only a
66
remote or attenuated connection to the removal of an alien,” or
“claims that are independent of, or wholly collateral to, the removal
67
process.”
59
60
61

62
63
64
65

66
67

Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 269.
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 313 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted), quoted in
Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 270.
Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 269–70 (citing Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 232 F.3d 328, 340 (2d
Cir. 2000)); see also Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 9 (“In enacting section 1252(b)(9), Congress
plainly intended to put an end to the scattershot and piecemeal nature of the review
process that previously had held sway in regard to removal proceedings.”); FloresMiramontes v. INS, 212 F.3d 1133, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that before the
enactment of § 1252(b)(9), motions to reopen were to be brought in the courts of
appeals whereas challenges to denials of stays of deportation could be brought in federal district courts under the general federal question statute).
See Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 269–70.
Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 10.
Id.
Motomura, supra note 31, at 424; see also Humphries v. Various Fed. Usins Employees,
164 F.3d 936, 943 (1999) (holding that if Congress had intended for the provisions of
the INA to be read more expansively, it could have used the term “related to,” which
would have relaxed the requirements under which claims could be barred).
Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 10.
Id. at 11; see also H.R. REP. No. 109-72, at 175 (2005) (Conf. Rep.) (“Moreover, section
106 would not preclude habeas review over challenges to detention that are independent of challenges to removal orders. Instead, the bill would eliminate habeas review
only over challenges to removal orders.”).
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Federal courts have thus determined what Congress did not intend the term “arise from” to mean. However, courts have had a
more difficult time assessing which claims “arise from” the underlying
removal proceeding, and which claims are merely collateral to such
proceedings. This inquiry has been particularly problematic in the
adjudication of Bivens or other similar constitutional claims.
Bivens claims may arise in the immigration context “when the government physically and forcibly apprehends noncitizens as part of the
68
process of removing them from the United States.” May plaintiffs in
these cases bring their Bivens claims to federal district court before a
69
final order of removal has been issued in the immigration courts?
The answer to this question has important consequences for the noncitizen attempting to make this challenge in court.
Forcing plaintiffs to wait to receive a final order of removal before
bringing their Bivens claims to court may require them to endure a
long wait, even though their constitutional claims may be at the core
70
of their case. If plaintiffs wished to expedite the court’s hearing of
their constitutional claims, they would be forced to rush the hearing
of their administrative claims, often resulting in an unfavorable con71
clusion, and then to let the time to appeal run.
Even if such plaintiffs took the chance of an unfavorable removal
order so they could expedite their constitutional case, they may be
further handicapped by the fact that the federal courts of appeals are
not fact-finding bodies. Courts of appeals rely on the records created
in the lower administrative body, including the proceedings in front
of the immigration judge and BIA, to review claims. If plaintiffs are
unable to establish the record necessary to argue their constitutional
case in a court of appeals, they are unlikely to prevail in this federal
72
court. Therefore, it is imperative that the delineation of federal
court jurisdiction in these types of cases is both clear and fair.
68

69

70
71
72

Motomura, supra note 31, at 431; see, e.g., Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1366
(5th Cir. 1987) (“[D]etained and allegedly mistreated before being deported . . . . We
hold that even excludable aliens are entitled to the protection of the due process
clause [sic] while they are physically in the United States.”).
In his 2000 article, Professor Motomura argues persuasively that § 1252(b)(9)’s jurisdictional limitation barring claims arising from a removal proceeding from being
brought in federal district court does not apply to Federal Tort Claims Act or Bivens
claims. Motomura, supra note 31, at 431. However, federal district and circuit courts
have not read the statute as narrowly as Professor Motomura prescribes and have adjudicated such claims on a case-by-case basis, creating tensions between various
courts’ holdings on the viability of plaintiffs’ Bivens claims in federal district courts.
Id.
Id. at 388.
See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (AADC), 525 U.S. 471, 476 (1999)
(“Since neither the Immigration Judge nor the Board of Immigration Appeals has authority to hear such claims . . . a challenge to a final order of deportation based upon
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Since the enactment of the IIRIRA, federal district courts and
courts of appeals have struggled to apply § 1252(b)(9) to claims of
constitutional violations and have failed to produce a coherent analytical method. The next Section describes the jurisprudence of
§ 1252(b)(9).
VI. APPLYING § 1252(b)(9)
A. A Tale of Beginnings: Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee
In 1999, the Supreme Court first dealt with § 1252 in Reno v. Amer73
ican-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (AADC).
The respondents,
non-citizens affiliated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, sued the federal government for targeting them for deporta74
tion because of their membership in a politically unpopular group.
75
While their suit was pending, Congress passed the IIRIRA. The government argued that the IIRIRA barred district court review of challenges to the deportation proceedings prior to the entry of a final or76
der of deportation. The Court, relying solely on § 1252(g), found
that Congress had deprived federal courts of jurisdiction to review
the Attorney General’s discrete decisions to “commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under
77
this Act.”
For the purposes of analyzing the Court’s jurisprudence on
§ 1252(b)(9), AADC is instructive in what it does not explicitly hold.
Its exclusive focus on § 1252(g) left unresolved the larger question of
whether § 1252(b)(9) is likewise made unavailable, absent a final removal order, ordinary judicial review in cases presenting constitutional issues but not strictly limited to removal proceedings (for ex78
ample, habeas corpus petitions).

73
74
75
76
77
78

such a claim would arrive in the court of appeals without the factual development necessary for decision.”).
Id. at 471.
Id. at 473–74.
Id. at 475.
Id.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), cited in AADC, 525 U.S. at 482.
AADC, 525 U.S. at 489 n.10.
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B. The First Foray into § 1252(b)(9): INS v. St. Cyr
Two years later, the Court applied its holdings in AADC to INS v.
79
St. Cyr. Though this case dealt primarily with respondent St. Cyr’s
habeas corpus application, it provides illuminating clues about the
Court’s initial treatment of the jurisdiction-limiting provisions of
§ 1252(b)(9) in the aftermath of AADC.
In St. Cyr, the respondent, a lawful, permanent United States resident, pleaded guilty to a criminal charge of selling a controlled sub80
stance in violation of state law, making him deportable. St. Cyr’s
removal proceedings had commenced after AEDPA and IIRIRA had
81
become effective. Among its many arguments, the INS claimed that
the federal district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over
St. Cyr’s habeas petition because § 1252 consolidated all questions for
82
judicial review to federal courts of appeals.
The Supreme Court noted that, though the purpose of
§ 1252(b)(9) was to consolidate judicial review of immigration proceedings in the courts of appeals, this provision did not bar habeas
jurisdiction over any removal orders not subject to judicial review un83
der § 1252(a)(1). This included orders against non-citizens made
84
removable for having committed criminal offenses. Furthermore,
the Court noted that the 1961 amendments channeled review of final
orders to courts of appeals but unequivocally permitted district courts
to continue to exercise jurisdiction over claims that fell outside a “fi85
nal order.”
Finally, the Court addressed the issue of alternative forums for relief. In particular, it noted that if it were possible for the question of
law St. Cyr raised to be answered in another judicial forum, it may
have been more inclined to accept the Government’s reading of
86
§ 1252 as barring such claims for relief.
However, since St. Cyr
lacked an alternative forum for his claim, the Court held that habeas
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2242 was not repealed by the jurisdic87
tion-limiting provisions of the AEDPA and IIRIRA.

79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

533 U.S. 289 (2001).
Id. at 293.
Id.
Id. at 309–12.
Id. at 313.
Id.
Id. at 313 n.37 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Reno v. Am.-Arab AntiDiscrim. Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 485 (1999)).
Id. at 314.
Id.
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While St. Cyr was the first case in which the Supreme Court
tackled issues raised by § 1252(b)(9), the Court narrowly tied its analysis to the viability of a plaintiff’s habeas petition and did not reach
the issue of § 1252(b)(9)’s effects on other constitutional claims.
C. Understanding the Issue of “Finality” for the Purposes of § 1252(b)(9)
Since the Court in St. Cyr specifically confined § 1252 to operating
only on final orders of removal, courts of appeals have also been confronted with determining when an order becomes “final.” In answering this question, they have had to explore the issue of exhaustion
and have determined that an order becomes final when the immigration judge issues an order which the BIA then affirms, or the time to
88
appeal expires. Since AADC and St. Cyr, courts continue to deal with
the multitude of claims that may arise out of removal proceedings,
89
including the issue of finality, claims against illegal deportation, and
90
ineffective assistance of counsel, and they have done so with little
guidance. An area in which courts have had particular difficulty in
determining whether the jurisdictional provisions of § 1252 apply is
in the realm of Bivens actions arising from facts or circumstances surrounding a plaintiff’s removal. The following section surveys existing
case law in which plaintiffs’ primary claims do not concern their removal, but constitutional claims. As will become evident, courts have
not approached this class of cases using a uniform rubric, but have
instead created distinctions between types of constitutional claims
that are barred under varying rationales.

88

89

90

See Halabi v. Ashcroft, 316 F.3d 807, 808 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that federal courts
do not have jurisdiction for claims where plaintiffs fail to exhaust their remedies in
immigration court (citing Montero-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 277 F.3d 1137, 1140–41 &
n.2 (9th Cir. 2002))); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)(B)(i) (“[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section . . . 1229b . . . of this title . . . .”).
See, e.g., Kumarasamy v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 453 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding
that Kumarasamy’s claim that his deportation was illegal because there was no order
of removal was entirely separate from any claim for judicial review of an order of removal, and was therefore not barred by § 1252(b)(9)).
See, e.g., Afanwi v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 788, 795–96 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that although the court did not have jurisdiction over Afanwi’s claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, § 1252(b)(9) did not create a jurisdictional bar to allowing federal courts
to consider this issue); Singh v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 969, 972 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding
that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with post-administrative
filings with the court of appeals falls outside the jurisdiction-limiting provisions of the
REAL ID Act).
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VII. APPLYING § 1252(b)(9) IN THE BIVENS CONTEXT
Courts applying § 1252(b)(9) to Bivens claims over the last ten
91
years have been unable to articulate any “simple, one-size-fits-all” answers, though they have valiantly tried to analyze the issues with varying degrees of success. This section will provide an overview of cases,
in order of their depth of § 1252(b)(9) analysis. The First Circuit in
Aguilar v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Eastern District
of New York in Arar v. Ashcroft provide two examples of the more rigorous and detailed treatments the federal courts have offered.
A. Aguilar v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
In Aguilar, federal officers conducted a raid targeting more than
300 rank-and-file employees of a Department of Defense contractor
92
for civil immigration infractions. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) then transferred a significant proportion of these
detainees to detention and removal operation centers that were a
93
considerable distance away. The employee-detainees alleged that
they: (1) were subject to arbitrary, prolonged, and indefinite detention; (2) were denied a prompt bond hearing prior to any transfer;
(3) were denied access to counsel; and (4) suffered from loss of fami94
ly integrity.
The First Circuit began its analysis with an exercise in statutory
95
construction. Noting Congress’s goal in consolidating and channeling questions arising from the removal process, the First Circuit held
that the words “arising from” in § 1252(b)(9) should be read to exclude those claims that are “independent of, or wholly collateral to,
96
the removal process.” Therefore, the court found that § 1252(b)(9)

91
92
93
94
95
96

Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 510 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2007).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 11. The First Circuit drew upon the long-recognized exception to the exhaustion requirement for claims that are collateral to administrative proceedings. Id. at
12; see also Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 212–13 (1994) (stating
courts have previously deemed claims collateral when requiring exhaustion would foreclose all meaningful judicial review). “[C]ourts have demonstrated a particular
hostility toward requiring exhaustion when adequate relief could not feasibly be obtained through the prescribed administrative proceedings.” Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 12
(citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 (1976)). This is particularly true when
a party would be irreparably harmed by adherence to an exhaustion requirement.
Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 483 (1986).
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carried an inherent exception for claims that are independent from
97
removal orders that could be applied to the Bivens context.
The court found such an exception important because requiring
the exhaustion of constitutional claims in administrative proceedings
98
would “foreclose them from any meaningful judicial review.” Since
Congress’s intention was “to channel, rather than bar, judicial review,” the First Circuit held that courts must not read “arising from”
99
as used in § 1252(b)(9) to encompass those claims that cannot be
raised efficaciously within the administrative proceedings of the
100
INA. The court found that such claims could not, by definition, be
101
ones that arise from an alien’s removal.
Having established these foundational precepts, the First Circuit
went on to examine whether § 1252(b)(9) required the petitioners to
102
exhaust their specific claims in the administrative framework. The
court first examined petitioners’ conditions-of-confinement claims
and dismissed them on procedural grounds because these claims
103
were not raised in the lower court pleadings. However, it is unclear
whether the court would have found these claims barred by
104
§ 1252(b)(9) had they been raised on procedurally solid grounds.
The court reached the contrary conclusion with respect to petitioners’ right-to-counsel claims. Such claims, the Court held, were so
intertwined with the removal process that allowing aliens to bring
them directly to district court would result in the fragmented litiga105
tion Congress sought to avoid in enacting the INA amendments.
Moreover, the court acknowledged that petitioners could raise and
seek redress for these claims before an immigration judge and the
106
BIA before coming to the court of appeals.
Hence, the right-tocounsel claims “arise from” and are part-and-parcel of the removal
107
proceeding, and they are barred by § 1252(b)(9) from district court
review.
Finally, the court considered petitioners’ due process claims “alleg[ing] violation[] of the Fifth Amendment right of parents to make
97

98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 11; see also Sissoko v. Rocha, 440 F.3d 1145, 1156–57 n.18 (9th Cir.
2006) (finding that the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) do not
foreclose a non-citizen’s claims for money damages under Bivens).
Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 13.
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decisions as to the care, custody, and control of their children.”
Though these claims are somewhat connected to removal, the court
found that: (1) the right to family integrity is only marginally related
to removal; (2) the harm from continuing disruption may be irreparable; and (3) the issue is not one which the immigration court would
109
ordinarily adjudicate. Furthermore, since the issue of family integrity is generally “completely irrelevant” to the variety of issues that are
likely to be litigated in removal proceedings, and the claims typically
have no bearing on the aliens’ immigration status, § 1252(b)(9) does
110
not bar such claims.
The court also noted that the fact that petitioners have no other means by which to assert this right further ar111
gued in favor of jurisdiction.
B. Arar v. Ashcroft
In a 2009 en banc opinion, the Second Circuit in Arar v. Ashcroft
adjudicated another set of constitutional claims arising from removal
112
proceedings.
However, this court, unlike the First Circuit in Aguilar, did not reach the question of whether the INA deprived the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction over Arar’s removal-related
113
Bivens claims.
Instead, it dismissed those claims as beyond the
reach of Bivens, without addressing the “vexed question” of law arising from an analysis of the applicability of the INA’s jurisdiction114
stripping provisions.
Though the Second Circuit opted to avoid
deciding whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction
over Arar’s removal-related Bivens claims, the district court’s treatment of the issue provides useful insight into the manner in which
courts currently analyze the jurisdictional bar.
Plaintiff Arar was a “native of Syria who immigrated to Canada
115
with his family.” While in transit at JFK airport in New York, he was
identified as the member of a known terrorist organization and was
interrogated by officials, held in solitary confinement, and denied re116
peated requests to speak to his lawyer. Arar was later given an op108
109
110
111
112

113
114
115
116

Id. at 18–19.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding district court and panel decisions dismissing defendant’s contention that mistreatment suffered while in U.S. custody provided a basis for a claim under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause),
aff’g on other grounds, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
Id. at 571.
Id.
Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 252.
Id. at 253.
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portunity to return to Syria but refused, citing a fear of being tor117
tured.
The INS initiated removal proceedings, subsequently determined
Arar was clearly part of al Qaeda and was therefore inadmissible to
118
the United States, and ordered him to be sent to Syria. When Arar
was handed over to the Syrians, United States officials had not in119
formed the Canadian consulate of his removal.
A Final Notice of
Inadmissibility ordered Arar removed without further inquiry before
120
an immigration judge.
Arar raised four claims for relief in the district court, two of which
are relevant to the study of § 1252(b)(9): (1) that defendants violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment by knowingly subjecting
him to torture in Syria; and (2) that he was denied access to counsel,
the courts, and the consulate in violation of his Fifth Amendment
121
rights.
Reviewing the jurisdictional limitations imposed by the INA, the
court noted that the amendments to the INA were designed “to
create a streamlined procedure allowing for the effective administration of the immigration laws so that the removal of illegal aliens can
proceed with as much alacrity as possible while maintaining a mini122
mum of procedural due process.”
Therefore, it held that the underlying question to be decided was whether Arar’s claims, at the
123
core, challenged his removal.
The district court disagreed with the government’s attempts to redefine Arar’s action as “a simple challenge to circumstances ‘arising
124
out of’” Arar’s removal. The court noted that Arar’s claims did not
concern why the government chose to send Arar to Syria or attack the
125
bases of sending him there.
Instead, Arar’s claims concerned the
legality of sending him to a country where they knew he would be tor126
tured and arbitrarily detained. Therefore, the district court found
that Arar’s allegations are separate from, and collateral to, the under127
lying removal order under which he was deported.

117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

Id.
Id.
Id. at 254.
Id.
Id. at 257–58.
Id. at 268.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 268–70.
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Arar’s situation was unusual, if not unique, because he did not
128
have the opportunity to challenge his removal at a hearing at all. In
this case, Arar alleged that federal officials obstructed him from filing
129
his claim that he was denied access to counsel.
The court noted
that this deprivation did not leave Arar in a position similar to other
deportees, who could wait to conclude their administrative proceed130
ings before seeking review in a court of appeals.
Since Arar’s claims did not challenge his deportation, but rather
the legality of deportation to Syria where he would likely be tortured
and because the administrative procedure would not remedy his lack
of counsel claim. The district court found that his claims were separate from and collateral to his removal and not barred by
131
§ 1252(b)(9).
C. Turkmen v. Ashcroft
In 2006, the Eastern District of New York also determined whether
right-to-counsel claims were subject to the jurisdictional bars of
132
In Turkmen v. Ashcroft, the plaintiffs were arrested
§ 1252(b)(9).
133
and detained on immigration violations following the 9/11 attacks.
During the time of their detention, plaintiffs asserted that they were
not issued their Notices to Appear (NTAs) in a timely fashion, they
were denied bond on the basis of religion and ethnicity without assessing flight risk, they were subjected to a communications blackout
that interfered with their access to counsel, and they were detained
for longer than was necessary after receiving their final orders of re134
moval.

128
129
130
131

132

133
134

Id. at 269.
Id.
Id. (citing Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 479 (1999)).
Though the court held that Arar’s claims were not barred by § 1252(b)(9), it still found it
did not have proper jurisdiction to entertain his Bivens claims because of overriding factors counseling hesitation. Id. at 283. Since the district court felt that the task for balancing individual rights against such serious national security concerns was not one courts
should undertake, it directed the Legislative and Executive branches to design a suitable
remedy or enact explicit legislation directing judges to do so. Id.
Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02 CV 2307, 2006 WL 1662663, at *25 (E.D.N.Y. June 14,
2006), rev’d on alternate grounds, 589 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2009). The Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the district court, but on grounds
separate from the jurisdictional bar of § 1252(b)(9). Turkmen, 589 F.3d at 542. Since
the Second Circuit’s opinion does not concern the jurisdictional bar at issue here, the
district court’s decision remains instructive on this issue in this case.
Turkmen, 2006 WL 1662663, at *1.
Id. at *2.
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The district court found that plaintiffs’ challenges to the denial of
135
It first noted that the regulabond were barred by § 1252(b)(9).
tions governing the jurisdiction of the BIA specifically provide that
“the Board may review appeals from [d]eterminations relating to
136
bond.” That these challenges could have been reviewed by the BIA
was instrumental in the court’s finding that the plaintiffs could not
137
bring them to district court.
Moreover, the court also found that the denial of bond was not an
issue separate and apart from the underlying removal proceeding,
but instead served to assure the plaintiffs’ presence at later stages of
138
the removal proceedings.
The court found this to be exactly the
kind of claim Congress had in mind when it enacted § 1252(b)(9) to
139
bar judicial review by the district court.
Plaintiffs also alleged that the communications blackout violated
their rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment, including
140
access to legal counsel. The court acknowledged an alien’s right to
counsel in a proceeding before an immigration judge, but noted that
a claim to this right could properly be presented to the BIA and then
141
to the court of appeals.
The court then turned to the question of whether the communications blackout arose out of a removal proceeding and was thus
barred by § 1252(b)(9). It found that the phrase “action taken . . . to
remove an alien” implied any action taken for the purpose of removing an alien, and it held that the purpose of the communications
blackout was not to remove the plaintiffs, but instead to reduce the
142
risk of further terrorist attacks. Therefore, the court found that the
plaintiffs’ communications blackout claim was not barred by
143
§ 1252(b)(9).
Similarly, plaintiffs’ challenges to the Attorney General’s delay in
serving them with NTAs after detaining them were not barred by
144
§ 1252(b)(9).
In the sequence of events in immigration proceedings, the court noted that the service of the NTA marks the beginning of the process by which action is taken or proceedings are
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144

Id. at * 25.
Id. at *25 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(7)).
Id. at *25.
Id. at *26 n.28.
Id. at *26.
Id.
Id.
Id. (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
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brought against an alien and the purpose of detention is declared.
Therefore, the court found that a failure to bring proceedings is not
within the scope of § 1252(b)(9), and plaintiffs’ claims challenging
the delay in serving them with NTAs should properly be heard in dis146
trict court.
Finally, the court addressed plaintiffs’ length-of-detention
147
claims.
In its discussion of the implications of § 1252(b)(9), the
court stated that, since challenges to the length of detention are not
actions subject to review under § 1252(a)(1), § 1252(b)(9) does not
148
apply.
D. Turnbull v. United States
A year later, in 2007, the district court in the Northern District of
Ohio was asked to adjudicate a case in which the result turned on
what constitutes an “order of removal,” as described by § 1252(a)(1),
149
that might make the § 1252(b)(9) jurisdictional bar applicable. In
150
Turnbull v. United States, the plaintiff was a native and citizen of Ja151
maica who had served time for drug trafficking convictions.
“[P]rior to his release from prison on his second conviction, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) commenced deportation
152
proceedings against [him].” After he exhausted his administrative
153
Just before he
appeals, the INS served a Warrant of Deportation.
was deported, he contacted his attorney, who then sought and was
154
granted a stay in the district court.
However, though they were
aware of the stay, ICE officers neglected to remove Turnbull from the
155
plane.
The district court subsequently entered an order directing
156
the United States “to immediately retrieve Turnbull from Jamaica.”
Turnbull was returned to the United States thirty-two days after he

145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

155
156

Id.
Id.
Id. at *27.
Id. at *27 n.30.
Turnbull v. United States, No. 1:06cv858, 2007 WL 2153279, at *5 (N.D. Ohio July 23,
2007).
Id.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2 (“Before getting on the plane, plaintiff was allowed to place a telephone call
to his mother, and she in turn contacted plaintiff’s counsel.” (internal citation omitted)).
Id.
Id.
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had been deported. He filed suit, seeking damages against certain
157
individual federal agents under Bivens.
The court rejected the government’s argument that § 1252(b)(9)
bars jurisdiction for reasons similar to those expressed by the Turkmen
158
court.
Primarily, the court noted that Turnbull’s claim was not a
back-door attempt “to circumvent the administrative process set up to
159
review orders of removal.” Rather, his suit was “specifically limited
to an attack upon the decision to disregard the Magistrate Judge’s
160
stay order.” The claim did not implicate an order of removal under
§ 1252(a)(1), but instead was based upon the actions of several fed161
eral officers after a stay to such an order was entered.
Therefore,
the court found that § 1252(b)(9) did not bar Turnbull’s claims from
162
being brought in district court.
E. Khorrami v. Rolince
In the same year as Turbull, Khorrami v. Rolince was decided. The
plaintiff, Dr. Khorrami, was an Iranian-born British citizen residing in
163
In the days following September 11, 2001, Dr.
the United States.
Khorrami was interrogated by the FBI with the use of threatening and
abusive language and was denied permission to contact the British
164
embassy and his family. The immigration judge issued a final order
165
However, the judge also
finding Dr. Khorrami to be removable.
granted Dr. Khorrami’s request for permanent residence status based
166
on his marriage to a United States citizen.
As a result, though he
167
was deemed removable, Dr. Khorrami was not deported. Dr. Khorrami filed suit for Bivens violations arising from allegedly prolonged
168
and abusive interrogation and denials of access to counsel.
In this case, the court did not analyze whether the claims were intertwined with the removal process. Instead, the court decided the
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

164
165
166
167
168

Id.
Id. at *6; see also supra Section VII.C.
Turnbull, 2007 WL 2153279 at *6.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.
493 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1064 (N.D. Ill. 2007), aff’d on other grounds 539 F.3d 782 (7th
Cir. 2008). The government appealed the district court’s decision in Khorrami v. Rolince on the issue of qualified immunity, and the Seventh Circuit did not address the
question of § 1252(b)(9) jurisdiction. Khorrami, 539 F.3d at 782. Therefore, for purposes of the jurisdictional bar, the district court opinion controls.
Khorrami, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 1064.
Id. at 1065.
Id. at 1065–66.
Id. at 1066.
See id. at 1061.
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applicability of § 1252(b)(9) by focusing primarily on the fact that “it
169
It
only applies with respect to review of an order of removal.”
found that though he was deemed removable, Dr. Khorrami’s grant
of permanent residency functioned as an adjustment of status, not a
170
removal order. The fact that a formal removal order was not appli171
cable takes it out of the realm of the applicability of § 1252(b)(9).
Since a final removal order was not issued, § 1252(b)(9) provides no
172
bar to bringing removal-related claims in district court.
F. The Outlier: Arias v. United States Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement
In a move that diverged from the majority of federal court cases
that had reviewed the applicability of the § 1252(b)(9) jurisdictional
bar to Bivens actions, the district court for the District of Minnesota in
2008 held categorically that all Bivens claims arising out of circumstances surrounding immigration proceedings were barred from plea
173
In Arias v. United States
in federal district court by § 1252(b)(9).
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, ICE agents implemented a civil
immigration enforcement operation by forcibly entering homes illegally and conducting warrantless, non-consensual searches of the
174
plaintiffs who were thought to have remained in the United States.
175
They subsequently arrested the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court under Bivens, alleging that the ICE agents had vi176
olated their Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.
Relying on the First Circuit’s analysis in Aguilar, the district court
held that the plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims were
“common in removal proceedings and could directly im177
pact . . . [their] immigration status.”
The court further noted that
“allowing aliens to ignore the channeling provisions of § 1252(b)(9)
and bring [these] claims directly in the district court” would fragment the removal process and interfere with the efficient administra-

169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

Id. at 1066–1067.
Id. at 1067.
Id.
Id.
See Arias v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, No. 07-1959, 2008 WL
1827604 (D. Minn. Apr. 23, 2008).
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *6.
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178

tion of immigration laws.
Therefore, the court held it lacked sub179
ject-matter jurisdiction to consider these Bivens claims.
VIII. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE CASES: PUTTING TOGETHER
§ 1252(b)(9) AND BIVENS
Since St. Cyr, several federal district and circuit courts have attempted to analyze the applicability of the § 1252(b)(9) bar to various Bivens claims but, as the previous section shows, they have used
differing rationales in adjudicating the same classes of claims. This
Section attempts to reconcile the methodology used by these courts
and draws inferences about what types of constitutional claims may
be jurisdictionally barred under current standards.
All of the cases discussed agree on one central proposition: claims
which are wholly independent of those issues arising from removal
proceedings should not be barred from adjudication in federal dis180
trict court. The disagreement and confusion in the cases discussed
seems to center on which claims “arise from”—and what tests should
be used to determine whether a claim “arises from”—a removal pro181
ceeding.
One of the more common types of constitutional claims that arise
in contexts that would implicate immigration issues is the right to
182
counsel, as exemplified in Aguilar, Arar, and Turkmen. Of these cases, only the district court in Arar recognized the independence of
183
right-to-counsel claims from the underlying removal proceedings.
The courts in Aguilar and Turkmen, in dismissing these claims as being barred by § 1252(b)(9), noted that the chief reason that such
claims should not be brought in federal district court is that they can
be administratively addressed within the immigration courts, i.e., that
the BIA and immigration courts had jurisdiction to hear such claims,

178
179
180
181

182

183

Id. (alteration in original) (citing Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 510 F.3d 1, 13–14 (1st Cir. 2007).
Id.
E.g., Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 11; see also supra Section VII.
Compare, e.g., Khorrami v. Rolince 493 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1067 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (finding no
§ 1252(b)(9) jurisdictional bar on the grounds that no removal order had been issued),
aff’d on other grounds 539 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2008), with Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d
250, 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that claims challenging lack of counsel and the legality
of removal to a country where torture was likely did not directly contest deportation, and
therefore were not barred), aff’d on other grounds, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
See Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 7; Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02 CV 2307, 2006 WL 1662663, at *1–
*2 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2006), rev’d on alternate grounds, 589 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2009); Arar,
414 F. Supp. 2d at 257–58; see also supra Sections VII.A–C.
Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 269; see also supra Section VII.B.
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and that these claims were often brought to immigration court within
184
the context of their removal proceedings. In contrast, Judge Trager
found in Arar that since Arar’s right-to-counsel claim did not arise out
of a challenge to his removal order, but instead out of a challenge to
the legality of his rendition, these claims were not barred by
185
§ 1252(b)(9).
Another common category of constitutional claims concerns the
length of detention. Both Turkmen and Khorrami examined slightly
different claims and produced decisions that, while consistent in outcome, diverged in analysis. In Turkmen, the court analyzed claims
protesting the government’s delay in issuing the plaintiffs’ NTAs, or
protesting the time plaintiffs were held in detention, not from the
standpoint of whether such claims are generated by the underlying
removal proceeding but in terms of the purpose behind the govern186
ment’s actions.
The Turkmen court found that since the government’s delay in issuing the NTAs and the resulting lengthy detention
were not done in furtherance of their removal, these actions could
not be considered to have “arisen from” the underlying removal pro187
ceeding.
In contrast, the court in Khorrami considered the issue far more
narrowly, deciding simply that the plaintiff’s claims objecting to the
government’s post-NTA detention and pre-NTA interrogation and
arrest were not barred because no order of removal had been is188
sued. Since § 1252(b)(9) only applies to claims arising from orders
of removal, that section of the INA was held inapplicable in this con189
text. Since the plaintiffs in Turkmen were only challenging their detention after a final order of removal had been issued, the court might
have been able to use the same analysis as the Khorrami court in allow190
ing the claims to go forward in district court. Yet, the court chose
to concentrate on the government’s intent in detaining and delaying
191
the issuance of the NTAs.
The court in Turnbull used the same temporal analysis as the court
in Khorrami to analyze whether the plaintiff’s claims protesting his
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191

Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 13–14; Turkmen, 2006 WL 1662663 at * 26; see also supra Sections
VII.A, VII.C.
Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 269; see also supra Section VII.B.
Turkmen, 2006 WL 1662663 at *26; see also supra Section VII.C.
Turkmen, 2006 WL 1662663 at *26; see also supra Section VII.C.
Khorrami v. Rolince 493 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1067 (N.D. Ill. 2007); see also supra Section
VII.C.
Khorrami, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 1067; see supra Section VII.E; See also supra Section 6.E.
Turkmen, 2006 WL 1662663 at *26–*27; see also supra Sections VII.C, VII.E.
Turkmen, 2006 WL 1662663 at *26–*27; see also supra Section 6.E.
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deportation to Jamaica (notwithstanding the magistrate’s stay order)
192
Here, the
were barred from consideration under § 1252(b)(9).
court noted that, though an order of removal had been issued earlier
in the case, the magistrate’s order staying the removal served to override the order of removal, restoring the plaintiff to a pre-order-of193
removal state. Therefore, like the Khorrami court, this court found
194
that § 1252(b)(9) did not apply.
The Turkmen court also analyzed two, separate claims that were
not examined by any of the other courts in the earlier examples: (1)
195
bond determination, and (2) communications blackouts.
While
the court found that the bond determination claim was barred by
§ 1252(b)(9), it held that the claims against communications blackouts could be brought properly in federal district court, but it used
196
In dismissing the
different rubrics to support these conclusions.
bond determination claims, the court found that since the BIA could
review appeals of issues arising from bond determination claims, such
claims necessarily arose from the underlying order of removal and
197
were therefore barred by § 1252(b)(9).
On the other hand, in accepting jurisdiction of the communications blackout claim, the same court looked to the purpose of the gov198
ernment’s actions. Because the government’s motives in instituting
the actions to which the plaintiffs were objecting were distinct and
entirely separate from those associated with removal, the court found
that these claims did not arise from orders of removal and could be
199
considered in federal district court.
Similarly, the Aguilar court also relied on varying rationales for allowing the plaintiff’s conditions-of-confinement and family integrity
200
claims to continue through the district court. In the conditions-ofconfinement analysis, the court relied on the same reasoning it had
201
It first asked whether
used in analyzing the right-to-counsel issue.
the conditions-of-confinement claims could be handled efficaciously
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201

Turnbull v. United States, No. 1:06cv858, 2007 WL 2153279, at *5–*6 (N.D. Ohio July 23,
2007); Khorrami, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 1067; see supra Sections VII.D and VII.E.
Turnbull, 2007 WL 2153279 at *5–*6; see also supra Section VII.D.
Turnbull, 2007 WL 2153279 at *6; Khorrami, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 1067; see also supra Section
VII.D.
Turkmen, 2006 WL 1662663 at *25–*26; see also supra Section VII.C.
See Turkmen, 2006 WL 1662663 at *25–*26; see also supra Section VII.C.
Turkmen, 2006 WL 1662663 at *25–*26; see also supra Section VII.C.
Turkmen, 2006 WL 1662663 at *26; see also supra Section VII.C.
Turkmen, 2006 WL 1662663 at *25–*26; see also supra Section VII.C.
Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 510 F.3d 1, 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2007);
see also supra Section VII.A.
See Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 13; see also supra Section VII.A.
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202

in the administrative context.
Here, however, the answer was different: the conditions-of-confinement claim could not have been
properly addressed in immigration court and, absent an appropriate
203
administrative forum, could not be barred by § 1252(b)(9).
In analyzing the family integrity claims, however, the Aguilar court
relied on vastly different reasoning to determine that these claims
204
could not be barred either. The court found that the family integrity claims had only a “tenuous” link to the plaintiff’s removal and for
205
that reason were not covered by § 1252(b)(9). The court made only
passing mention of the standard it had used in analyzing the condi206
tions-of-confinement and right-to-counsel claims.
Finally, in a move that diverged from all of the previous case law,
the court in Arias held, categorically, that all unreasonable search and
seizure claims were barred from being brought in federal district
court because such “claims [were] common in removal proceedings
207
and could directly impact the plaintiff’s immigration status.”
The
court, however, did not adequately explain its meaning or illustrate
the extent of the “impact” it perceived, and its decision seems diame208
trically opposed to all of the other cases examined above.
Ironically, the 1996 amendments to the INA complicated the judicial scheme in an attempt to consolidate and simplify judicial review
of aliens in removal proceedings. The Supreme Court has provided
little assistance in bringing clarity to this area of the law, leaving the
courts of appeals and district courts to muddle through the statute’s
text and legislative history in cases covering a wide expanse of constitutional law. The result has been a jurisprudence of confusion, with
courts stating results but failing to provide an underlying theory. As
the cases surveyed show, each constitutional claim is analyzed in a vacuum, with courts making ad hoc judgments about whether that particular claim “arises from” an underlying order of removal. Even
within a particular case, a district court presented with multiple constitutional claims sometimes uses different tests and rationales in deciding whether § 1252(b)(9) is a bar. This inconsistency has engendered more confusion in other courts as they look to one another for
202
203
204
205
206
207

208

See Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 13; see also supra Section VII.A.
See Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 13; see also supra Section VII.A.
See Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 19; see also supra Section VII.A.
Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 19.
Id.
Arias v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, No. 07-1959, 2008 WL 1827604 at
*6 (D. Minn. Apr. 23, 2008) (holding, unlike every other case, that all Bivens claims are
categorically barred by § 1252(b)(9)).
Id.; see also supra Section VII.F.
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guidance. The result is a collage of high-level theories about what the
statute means and how Congress intended for it to be applied, but no
consistent underlying theory of how it should be applied in cases involving constitutional claims.
IX. PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. Legal Scholarship
Legal scholarship in this area is likewise lacking in guidance.
While a great deal of work has concentrated on the implications of
the recent amendments to the INA on habeas corpus jurisdiction in
209
federal court, few scholars have examined how § 1252(b)(9) should
be interpreted within the context of constitutional claims such as Bivens claims. Most notably, Professor Motomura offered an interpretation of § 1252(b)(9) that focused on a narrow reading of the provi210
sion.
In support, he analogized the way the courts read phrases
similar to “arising from” in other contexts and found that courts applying the federal question jurisdiction language of “arising under,”
appellate jurisdiction language of “final decision,” and supplemental
jurisdiction language of “case or controversy” all apply them narrow211
ly.
In drawing these parallels, Motomura persuasively argues that
the phrase “arising from” in the context of § 1252(b)(9) should also
212
be interpreted narrowly.
In attempting to illustrate the possible application of the “significant and independent” analysis to determine the interaction between
the claims plaintiffs present and the underlying order of removal,
Motomura suggested using the Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.
213
collateral order analysis. Unfortunately, the Cohen analysis often in209

210
211
212
213

See, e.g., David M. McConnell, Judicial Review Under the Immigration and Nationality Act: Habeas Corpus and the Coming of the REAL ID (1996–2005), 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 75 (2007);
Gerald L. Neuman, On the Adequacy of Direct Review After the REAL ID Act of 2005, 51 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 133 (2007); Peter Bibring, Jurisdictional Issues in Post-Removal Habeas Challenges to Orders of Removal, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 135 (2002); Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisidction
and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1963 (2000); Matthew
J. Droskoski, Criminal Aliens Get Pinched: Sandoval v. Reno, AEDPA’s and IIRIRA’s Effect on
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, 45 VILL. L. REV. 711 (2000).
See generally Motomura, supra note 31 (arguing § 1252(b)(9) jurisdiction bars do not apply
to the Federal Tort Claims Act or Bivens claims).
Id. at 417–23.
Id. at 414.
Id. at 426; see also Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (allowing for interlocutory appeals for a “small class [of orders] which finally determine claims
of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to
be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate con-
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volves case-by-case considerations that do not lend themselves to uniformity. Furthermore, Motomura’s test does not flesh out in detail
the method that courts should use to analyze whether these claims
are separate and important, essentially presenting the same problem
as the jurisdictional bar issue in immigration claims for which Motomura offers the Cohen analysis as a solution. Hence, the Cohen analysis cannot provide courts with much extra guidance in analyzing the
issues involved in the immigration cases—it merely presents a restatement of the problem in an analogous context.
Specifically, Motomura argues that the Federal Tort Claims Act
and Bivens cases categorically do not “arise from” removal proceed214
ings.
He contends that although these cases often contain claims
that “relate to” removal proceedings, they do not “arise from” such
215
proceedings.
Therefore, they should categorically be treated as
“significant and independent matters” for purposes of applying the
216
jurisdictional bar of § 1252(b)(9).
Unfortunately, as was demonstrated in earlier sections, courts applying § 1252(b)(9) since Motomura’s articulation of the appropriate scope of the rule have found
that there are some constitutional claims that are barred by
217
§ 1252(b)(9) and others that are not. Therefore, Motomura’s analysis, whatever its normative appeal, does not satisfactorily describe or
explain the choices courts have actually made.
Courts seem to be applying differing analyses to this question
without an underlying theory, and scholars have been relatively reticent in providing a theory of their own. But certain patterns and
goals have emerged from adjudicated cases that lend themselves to
fashioning a theory for analysis that can be applied going forward,
without severely damaging the precedential value of these cases.

214
215
216
217

sideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated”). Since Cohen, the Supreme
Court has distilled these requirements and applies them to those district court decisions:
(1) that are conclusive, (2) that resolve important questions completely separate from the
merits, and (3) that would render such important questions effectively unreviewable on
appeal from final judgment in the underlying action. Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 866-868 (1994). Professor Motomura suggests using the
same method of analysis as the second of the three requirements, the separate and important requirement, in the context of § 1252(b)(9) defenses as well.
Motomura, supra note 31, at 431.
Id.
Id.
See supra Section VII (discussing many courts’ bar of right-to-counsel claims and their
mixed approaches to length-of-detention claims).
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B. A Different Approach
As a threshold matter, courts should first determine, in terms of
timing, whether § 1252(b)(9) applies at all in deciding if constitutional claims should be barred from district court.
Section
1252(b)(9) requires that the claim arise from a final order of remov218
al. The cases decided when read together with the statute seem to
have created a window during which § 1252(b)(9) is applicable in
deciding such claims. The court in Turkmen found that pre-NTA interrogation and arrest claims do not arise from an order of removal
219
because the removal process starts with the NTA. Any action taken
220
before an NTA is issued is not part of a removal proceeding.
Therefore, any action taken before an NTA is issued is not barred by
§ 1252(b)(9). As such, Turkmen described when the removal process
221
begins.
The court in Turnbull, on the other hand, helped clarify
when the timeframe for possible consolidation ends. The Turnbull
222
court found that a stay to removal restarts the removal process.
Therefore, it can be inferred that the grant of a removal order and
expiration of the time to appeal is the end of the timeframe—any action that a plaintiff wants to challenge that takes place after a removal
order has been entered is outside the requisite timeframe. Taken together, Turkmen and Turnbull show that only those actions that take
place after an NTA is issued and before a final order of removal has
been entered can possibly be barred by § 1252(b)(9). Any actions
taken outside of this window are categorically not barred and can be
brought in federal district court under the general federal jurisdiction statute.
After a court has answered this question, and if it determines that
the action the plaintiff is challenging falls within the requisite time
period, the court can then reach the merits of the government’s
§ 1252(b)(9) defense. In undertaking this analysis, the court must
first decide whether the claim is one that is independent of the removal process.
The district court in Arar noted that immigration court proceedings and BIA appeals are specialized, administrative functions that
deal with a discrete set of judicial issues: removal and deportation of
218
219
220
221
222

See INA § 242(b)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (Supp. III 1998).
Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02 CV 2307, 2006 WL 1662663, at *26 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2006),
rev’d on alternate grounds, 589 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2009).
See id.
See id.
Turnbull v. United States, No. 1:06cv858, 2007 WL 2153279, at *5 (N.D. Ohio July 23,
2007); see also supra Section VII.D.
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223

non-citizens. As such, the jurisdiction of immigration courts is specialized, limited, and clear. Immigration judges only hear cases that
involve the Department of Homeland Security’s investigation and
224
prosecution of a non-citizen’s presence in the United States.
The
only issues an immigration judge can decide are those that arise while
the immigration courts administratively regulate issues of deportation
225
or removal. This certainly does not mean that the only issues that
are of interest to immigration judges are decisions to remove an
alien. However, immigration judges have decided issues that are not
linked to the substance of the court’s decision to remove an alien
when these issues concern the process by which a court makes its removal decision. Examples of issues in which such concerns are implicated are in the areas of bond determinations, detention, and the
226
right to counsel. Indeed, claims of improper bond determination,
detention, and access to counsel come about only as a result of procedural shortcomings during the removal process. They do not address any substantive claims, which are usually the bases of a court’s
decision to remove. Therefore, immigration courts rely on substantive issues to make their removal decisions and have jurisdiction over
only those procedural claims that come about as a result of the removal determinations. Immigration courts do not have jurisdiction
over procedural claims that do not come about as a result of removal
decisions, nor do they have jurisdiction over non-removal substantive
claims.
Since the immigration courts have jurisdiction only over claims
that involve substantive issues regarding removal or procedural issues
arising out of the process of removal, these claims are clearly “inextricably linked” to the removal process and thus well within St. Cyr’s
227
definition of the scope of § 1252(b)(9). Hence, all claims that can
be brought to immigration court must be brought there (and not to a
federal district court), and, by virtue of § 1252(b)(9), those claims are
subject to review only in the courts of appeals.

223

224
225

226
227

Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[T]he INA deals overwhelmingly with the admission, exclusion and removal of aliens—almost all of whom seek to
remain within this country until their claims are fairly resolved.”). See supra Section VII.B.
Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Board of Immigration
Appeals, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2010).
Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, General Overview of Jurisdiction of the Courts, IMMIGRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/
benchbook/resources/criminal/1_jurisdiction.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2010).
See supra Section VII.
See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 313–14 (2001); see also supra Section VI.B.
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What about claims (such as Bivens claims) that cannot be brought
in immigration court, but involve circumstances surrounding removal
proceedings and in that attenuated sense “arise from” removal orders? Are they, too, barred by § 1252(b)(9)? If the immigration
courts do not have the ability to offer the remedy being sought by
that particular claim, it cannot have arisen from a removal proceeding and is thus not barred by § 1252(b)(9).
The converse is true as well: if a claim cannot be brought in immigration court, it does not deal substantively or procedurally with
removal. Hence, if a court finds that a claim cannot be brought in
the immigration court, it is not procedurally or substantively tied to
removal proceedings, does not “arise from” the underlying order of
removal, and is thus not barred by § 1252(b)(9). This conclusion is
particularly important because it ensures that individuals have the
ability to sue for constitutional grievances: if individuals were unable
to bring claims in both immigration and district courts, they will have
no opportunity to seek redress for these wrongs at all.
Tying all of these components together, courts must ask two questions before deciding whether a constitutional claim is barred by
§ 1252(b)(9): (1) did the claim arise from actions taken after an
NTA was issued, but before a final order of removal; and (2) can the
claim be brought in immigration court? If the answer to both of
these questions is yes, then § 1252(b)(9) bars the claim from being
considered in district court. If the answer to either one of these questions is no, then § 1252(b)(9) does not bar such claims from being
considered in federal district court.
The virtues of this analysis are embodied in certainty and uniformity. The current lack of standardization in the manner in which
federal courts apply the jurisdictional bar inevitably leads to both
false positive and false negative results. In the case of false positives
228
(for example, Arias), claims that should continue in federal district
court have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, thereby eliminating the plaintiff’s ability to obtain relief for the alleged violations. On
the other hand, some claims, like the right-to-counsel claims in
229
Arar, that should be dismissed because of the plaintiff’s ability to
properly seek relief in the administrative context could continue in
federal district court, clogging the dockets and frustrating the intent
of Congress by performing end-runs around the goal of consolida228
229

See Arias v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, No. 07-1959, 2008 WL 1827604,
at *6 (D. Minn. Apr. 23, 2008).
See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d on other grounds, 585
F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
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tion. Both outcomes weaken the fabric of the judiciary with poor results.
The solution proposed here will help judges decrease the number
of false positives and negatives and allow plaintiffs a clear sense of
which courts are most appropriate for filing their claims of constitutional violations. While there are many possible solutions that might
increase uniformity—indeed, bright-line rules, such as the one pro230
posed by the Arias court, are arguably more effective in creating
clear standards—the virtue of the solution proposed here is that it
ensures plaintiffs have a venue in which they may bring their claims,
without being dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Of foremost importance is that plaintiffs who have been wronged
should be able to obtain recovery, particularly for violations of fundamental rights that arise out of the Constitution. Allowing such
plaintiffs a defined venue for bringing such claims ensures that their
constitutional rights are protected.
The solution proposed here also ensures that the adjudicatory
process is streamlined: those courts that have the most expertise in
the administrative context (immigration courts) hear those cases involving their area of expertise. All other claims are heard and adjudicated, but by courts of general subject-matter jurisdiction. This
streamlined procedure produces the most efficient mechanism for
allowing plaintiffs to recover for constitutional grievances.
In order to illustrate how this analytical structure might function
in federal district courts, it is beneficial to apply this analysis to the
cases already discussed. While most of the outcomes will remain the
same, when examined in the aggregate this new analytical structure
will achieve better comity.
X. TEACHING OLD CASES NEW ANALYSES
A. Claims for Monetary Relief
Claims for monetary relief, like Bivens claims, are a class of cases
that are categorically not barred by § 1252(b)(9). Since immigration
courts cannot award damages, claims that seek monetary relief can-

230

See Arias, 2008 WL 1827604, at *6 (holding § 1252 bars all Fourth and Fifth Amendment
claims because they are “common in removal proceedings and could directly impact . . . immigration status”); see also supra Section VII.F.
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231

not be brought there. Such claims therefore fail the second prong
of the analysis, since plaintiffs cannot obtain relief for these claims in
immigration court. Therefore, such claims must be brought in federal district court.
In Arar, since Arar’s claims did not seek an adjustment of removal,
but only monetary damages under Bivens, which an immigration
232
court cannot award, his claims cannot effectively be brought there.
Therefore, the district courts cannot be divested of their jurisdiction
to hear his case, and § 1252(b)(9) should not bar Arar’s Bivens claims
from being heard in federal district court. Similarly, district courts
should not bar Turnbull’s, Khorrami’s, and Arias’ claims either, as
233
they, too, were seeking monetary relief.
B. Right-to-Counsel Claims
Since right-to-counsel claims arising out of actions taken after an
NTA is issued, but before a final order of removal, can be brought in
immigration court, these claims should be barred by § 1252(b)(9).
Both the Aguilar and Turkmen courts used this precise rationale in determining that these claims should be barred, though they did not
234
formally go through the first temporal step of the analysis.
C. Length-of-Detention and NTA-Related Claims
Using the proposed analysis, claims that protest the length of detention between the filing of an NTA and final order of removal
should be barred by § 1252(b)(9) since these claims can be brought
in immigration court. However, if a plaintiff files suit citing unreasonable pre-NTA detention or delay, as the plaintiffs did in Turkmen,
235
this claim must fall outside the scope of § 252(b)(9).

231

232
233

234

235

Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, General Overview of Jurisdiction of the Courts, IMMIGRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/
benchbook/resources/criminal/1_jurisdiction.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2010).
See Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 258.
See Arias, 2008 WL 1827604, at *4; Turnbull v. United States, No. 1:06cv858, 2007 WL
2153279, at *1 (N.D. Ohio July 23, 2007); Khorrami v. Rolince 493 F. Supp. 2d 1061,
1064 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
See Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 510 F.3d 1, 13–14 (1st Cir.
2007); Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02 CV 2307, 2006 WL 1662663, at *26 (E.D.N.Y. June
14, 2006), rev’d on alternate grounds, 589 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2009).
See Turkmen, 2006 WL 1662663, at *26.
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D. Bond Determination and Communication Blackouts
Under the new analysis, since the BIA may review appeals of issues
arising from bond determination, the immigration courts can, and
therefore should, have jurisdiction over these claims. This was, in
236
fact, the rationale offered by the Turkmen court. However, the opposite is true for the communications blackout claims. Since these
claims are usually not of the kind that are adjudicated by immigration
courts, such claims should not be barred by § 1252(b)(9). In Turkmen, the reasons for allowing these claims to go forward were twofold: (1) the communications blackout occurred before an NTA was
issued, and thus fell outside the scope of § 1252(b)(9); and (2) even
if a communications blackout had taken place after the issuance of an
NTA, this claim would still not be barred by § 1252(b)(9) because it is
not the type of claim over which immigration judges have jurisdic237
tion.
E. Conditions of-Confinement and Family Integrity
Turning to the First Circuit’s consideration of Aguilar’s conditions-of-confinement claims, the analysis here closely follows the analysis of the court in that case. Since these claims cannot be raised effectively in immigration courts, these claims should not be barred
238
In Aguilar, the First
from consideration in federal district court.
Circuit uses a similar rubric to achieve the same result. However, its
treatment of the family integrity claims is much different: the court
cites the tenuous link that the family integrity claims had with the fi239
nal order of removal to find that these claims were not barred. Using the new analysis, however, it is clear that family integrity issues
are, in general, not the business of immigration courts. Since immigration courts do not adjudicate claims of family integrity, these
claims should not be barred by § 1252(b)(9).
X. CONCLUSION
There has been a great deal of tension between different circuits
in deciding how and when to apply § 1252(b)(9). While many of the
outcomes can be reconciled, the manner in which courts reach these
outcomes varies widely from court to court, offering other courts and
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potential plaintiffs little guidance in determining whether certain
claims should be barred from being brought in federal district court.
The solution proposed here, suggesting that federal courts use a twostep process that first examines whether the plaintiff’s claim involves
actions that arise out of an order of removal, and then examines
whether such a claim can be effectively reviewed in immigration
court, offers courts and individuals a clear guide to determine this
question. This solution offers an optimal combination of judicial efficiency in barring claims that should properly be brought in the administrative setting (as dictated by Congressional intent when it
passed the IIRIRA), while offering every plaintiff alleging a constitutional wrong the opportunity to have his or her case adjudicated in
court. For these reasons, courts should adopt the solution proposed
and implement a fair and uniform method for determining whether
certain constitutional and Bivens claims are barred from district court
by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).

